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For years many states have asserted that resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly can make instant international law. Others have
argued that resolutions cannot provide the necessary state practice and
opinio juris to establish new norms. Still other observers maintain that
certain resolutions can contribute important evidence to support new
norms but that resolutions alone may not make new law. This dispute
remains unresolved.'
A similar conflict has now arisen with regard to the role that the
negotiation, adoption, and conclusion of international agreements may
play in developing new norms of customary international law. It has long
been recognized that international agreements have an important role in the
development of such norms.2 Recently, however, writers, international
courts, and statesmen have given support to the view that international
agreements, with little more, could give rise to new customary interna-
tional law that is binding on all states regardless of whether or not they
participated in the negotiations or became parties to the agreement. 3 There
is even some support for the view that international agreements that are not
yet in force could give rise to instant international law.4 Such developments
in the rules for establishing customary international law could have pro-
found implications for the international legal system.
Traditionally, the International Court of Justice identified three rela-
tively uncontroversial circumstances in which international agreements
may be relevant to finding customary international law: they can codify the
existing law, they can cause the law to crystallize, and they can initiate the
progressive development of new law.5 In each of these circumstances
states' negotiation and adoption of certain international agreements can
add to the evidence of customary international law. But with the exception
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Research for this paper was assisted by Ms. Anne
Hardiman, J.D. Vanderbilt University, 1986. Professor Charney has written a tribute to Professor Stein
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1. See infra notes 91-93.
2. See Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L 1 (1974-75);
Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 REc. DES CouRs 25,899-101 (1970); Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as
Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L 275 (1965-66); A. D'AMATo, THE
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 107, 164 (1972); H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY
LAW AND CODIFICATION 80-81 (1972).
3. See infra notes 83-88.
4. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
5. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 37-38.
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of some recent judgments, the Court had been clear that state practice
dehors the agreements, that opiniojuris were the principal considerations,
and that international agreements played limited roles. 6
It has never been clear, however, which circumstances of negotiation and
conclusion of international agreements contribute to new rules of custom-
ary law. The issues can be appreciated if one goes beyond generalities and
explores the relationship of specific agreements to customary law. Such an
examination has been facilitated by the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) which
contains a contemporary review of a wide range of public and private
international law topics. 7 This Restatement represents the views of some of
the best international law experts of the United States and abroad. It is also
an extremely important contribution to the law in its own right.8
6. Id. Some contrary indications may be found in the recent judgments in ocean boundary cases
before the Court. The negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the
resulting Convention on the Law of the Sea appear to have been given considerable importance. See
Continental Shelf (Malta v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29-30; Maritime Boundary in the
Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 294; Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 3, 38, 48-49.
7. There were seven tentative drafts of the Restatement. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAWv OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980), (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981), (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1982), (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983), (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984), (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985), (Tent.
Draft No. 7. 1986) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (Tent. Draft No. (Number))]. The Restatement
was adopted, with some amendments, at the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute at its
meeting in May, 1986. The final version is not yet published. See Annual meeting of the American Law
Institute, 54 U.S.L.W. 2593, 2595 (May 27, 1986).
8. The Restatement's role in domestic and international law is more powerful than in any other area
in which the ALI issues restatements. Unlike other areas of the law, judges of the United States consider
themselves to be less than expert in finding international law necessary to decide cases before them. As
a consequence, courts rely heavily on the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States. Even though the revised version of the Restatement has not been issued in its final form, courts
have already begun to rely upon it. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 n.5 (1982)
(definition of the word "treaty"); United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1027 n.3, 1036-37 n.21 (2d
Cir. 1985) (fact that the United States has negotiated a number of treaties on the subject of the exchange
of information in criminal matters); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1114 n. 13 (5th Cir. 1985)
(act of state doctrine); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricolo de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 520 (2d
Cir. 1985) (same); Pfeiffer v. Wrigley, Jr., 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985) (jurisdiction to prescribe);
Beattie v. United States, 756 F2d 91, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (jurisdiction over nationals abroad); Denby
v. Seaboard World Airlines, Inc., 737 F.2d 172, 176 n.5 (2d Cir. 1984) (rules for treaty interpretation);
In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (extradition).
The prior Restatement, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1965), has been used often. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466
U.S. 243, 259-60 (1984) (interpretation of the Warsaw Convention by state practice); Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,680 (1981) (settlement of international claims); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976) (foreign sovereign immunity); Transamerican Steam-
ship Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic Somali Shipping Agency, 767 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (jurisdiction to prescribe); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1985) (foreign
sovereign immunity); Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370,380 (7th Cir. 1985) (jurisdiction to prescribe).
It is also true that, unlike other areas of the law, the Restatement's characterization of a rule as
972
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For these reasons, this article will use the Restatement as a starting point
for examination of the function served by international agreements in the
development of customary law. This examination shows the difficulties that
are presented when international agreements are so used. It may be possi-
ble, however, to identify some factors which would help to distinguish
those agreements which may appropriately give rise to customary interna-
tional law and those which may not.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Restatement's General Rule
In its general provision on customary international law, the Restatement
states that international agreements may lead to the creation of customary
law when they are intended for general adherence and are widely accepted. 9
The Comment goes further and states that some widely accepted multi-
lateral agreements and wide networks of similar bilateral arrangements
which are widely accepted, "may come to be law for non-parties. . . by
virtue of state practice and opiniojuris resulting in customary law."1 0 Such
international law is legitimate evidence of the law itself. The Restatement directly contributes to the
development of the international law. The Restatement's report that a certain rule is the law can provide
a conception of the rule, writers' opinions, and, perhaps, even evidence of practice and opinio juris.
Courts take judicial notice of international law. Yet, many judges have had little exposure to
international law, and its sources are different from other law. Accordingly, many courts receive the
testimony of experts to help them identify international law relevant to the matters before them. See,
e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876, 879 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Louisiana, 420 U.S.
529 (1975). See also C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EviDerw 944 (3d ed. 1984).
9. RESTATEMENT § 102 (Tent. Draft No. 6) states in part:
(1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the international
community of states
(a) in the form of customary law ....
(2) Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation.
(3) International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to the creation
of customary international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by states
generally and are in fact widely accepted.
10. Id. comment f. The comment states in part that:
some multilateral agreements designed for adherence by states generally, widely accepted and not
rejected by a significant number of important states, and in some instances a wide network of
similar bilateral arrangements on a subject, may come to be law for non-parties. . . by virtue of
state practice and opinio juris resulting in customary law.
Id.
973
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international agreements themselves are viewed as state practice which can
contribute to the growth of customary international law. I I
A textual analysis of these statements reveals a number of issues:
1. When the Restatement speaks in Section 102(3) of "international
agreements" which may lead to the creation of customary international
law, is it referring to entire international agreements or particular rules
found within such agreements? Could a separate rule in an agreement move
into customary law independent of the context of the agreement, and, if so,
under what circumstances could this occur?
2. Are there considerations in addition to those set out in the Restatement
that would determine whether an international agreement, or a part thereof,
is suitable for becoming customary law?
3. If the negotiation and adoption of international agreements serve as
state practice and if, as the Restatement reports, a finding that states
conform to a rule from a sense of legal obligation (opiniojuris) requires no
explicit evidence and may be inferred from acts or omissions,12 can the
11. One comment states in part: "International agreements are practice of states and as such can
contribute to the growth of customary international law under § 102(2)." Id. comment i. See also id.
reporters' notes at 5. Even the negotiation of some international agreements appears to provide relevant
evidence:
International conferences, especially those engaged in codification of customary law, provide an
occasion for expressions by states as to the law on particular questions, and general consensus as to
the law at such a conference confirms customary law or contributes to its creation. See, e.g., as to
the law of the sea, Introductory Note to Part V.
RESTATEMENT § 102 reporters' notes at 2 (Tent. Draft No. 6).
12. Id. at comment c. Judge Manfred Lachs, in his dissent to the Judgment in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, supported the view that positive evidence of opiniojuris is not
required.
In sum, the general practice of States should be recognized as prima facie evidence that it is
accepted as law. Such evidence may, of course, be controverted-even on the test of practice itself,
if it shows "much uncertainty and contradiction." (Asylum, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.
277). It may also be controverted on the test of opiniojuris with regard to "the States in question"
or the parties to the case.
Id. at 231. The majority of the Court, however, took the opposite view:
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such. or be
carried out in such a way as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective
element, is implicit in the very notion of the opiniojuris sive necessitatis. The States concerned
must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency,
or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many international acts, e.g.,
in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are performed almost invariably, but which are
motivated only by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of
legal duty.
Id. at 44.
The function of opinio juris in customary lawmaking is discussed particularly in Cheng, United
Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
TEACHING AND PRACrICE 237, 250-54 (B. Cheng 1982), reprinted in 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23, 35-41
(1965). See also Walden, CustomarvInternational Law: A JurisprudentialAnalysis, 13 ISRAEL L. REV.
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negotiation and adoption of an international agreement lead to customary
law without more evidence? 13
Section 102 does not directly answer these questions. Perhaps the
answers are found within the substantive portions of the Restatement in
which the general provision is applied to specific international agreements.
B. Application of the Restatement's General Rule
1. The Effect of Multilateral Agreements on Customary International
Law
The Restatement identifies a number of areas in which multilateral
agreements are important in the identification of customary international
law. Those areas include the law of treaties, human rights, diplomatic
immunity, and the use of force. The treatment of each of those areas
provides valuable insights into the role such agreements may play in
international law making.
Perhaps the least controversial subject in which this question arises is in
the law of international agreements. 14 Even though the United States is not
a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 the Restatement
finds that customary law on the subject is dominated by that Convention. 16
The Convention undoubtedly meets the Restatement's criteria of an agree-
ment intended for widespread adherence. That effort has been successful. 17
In part, the Convention codified existing law derived from other sources. It
also helped to crystallize and progressively develop the law. 18
The Restatement treats the whole Convention as highly authoritative but
does not adopt the view that all rules found in the Convention have merged
into customary law. ' 9 Rather, the Restatement considers state practice and
86, 95-100 (1978).
13. D'Amato has argued that this question should be answered in the affirmative. A. D'AMATO,
supra note 2, at 164; D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REv.
1 10, 1146 (1982). Contra H. THmRLWAY, supra note 2, at 81-86; Akehurst, supra note 2; Baxter, Treaties
and Custom, supra note 2.
14. RESTATEMENT pt. III (Tent. Draft No. 6).
15. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969) (into force Jan. 27,
1980).
16. See RESTATEMENT pt. III introductory note at 2-7 (Tent. Draft No. 6); see also RESTATEMENT
§ 102 reporters' notes at 5.
17. RESTATEMENT pt. III introductory note at 2-7 (Tent. Draft No.6) (international agreements).
18. Particularly noteworthy are the Vienna Convention's contributions to the rules for determining
the permissibility of reservations to agreements and the effect of peremptory norms on inconsistent
international agreements.
19. The Restatement takes the position that the reservation rules found in the Convention are not yet
customary law. RESTATEMENT § 325 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 6); id. pt. III introductory note at 5; id.
§ 313 reporters' notes at 3.
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opinio juris dehors the Convention to determine whether particular rules
found in the Convention have merged into law. Such evidence of indepen-
dent state practice and opiniojuris is possible in this case. The Convention
was concluded more than sixteen years ago. States, courts, and writers have
applied the Convention rules during that sixteen-year period, even though
the Convention did not come into force until 1980.20
A similar case is presented in the human rights field. The Restatement
does find that a series of declarations and conventions intended for wide-
spread adherence have given rise to certain rules of customary international
law. 2' These findings, however, do not rest solely on the formal interna-
tional instruments. Rather, the Restatement refers to various institutions,
and to positions of state representatives, courts, and writers to support the
conclusion that certain human rights are part of customary international
law.22 The Restatement does not hold that the entirety of any specific
human rights agreement has merged into customary international law.
Rather, the agreements and declarations are considered supportive of the
finding that individual general rules have become customary law. 23
The case of diplomatic and consular immunity presents another situation
in which existing international agreements support customary law. 24 As the
International Court of Justice demonstrated in the Iranian Hostages case, 25
there are few rules of customary law that have been the subject of such long-
term and universal acceptance. The numerous international agreements on
20. See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 47 (Advisory Opinion); T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES (1974); S.
ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION
(1970); 1. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2d ed. 1984); Briggs, The
Travaux Preparatories of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 705 (1971);
Kearney & Dalton, The Treatyv on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970).
21. RESTATEMENT pt. VII introductory note at 449 (Tent. Draft No. 6) (protection of persons-
natural and juridicial).
22. Id. § 701 reporters' notes at 2.
23. RESTATEMENT comment a & § 702; Filartiga v. Pena-Irela, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
24. RESTATEMENT §§ 462-463 introductory note at 21-24 (Tent. Draft No. 4) (diplomatic and
consular immunities); id. § 461.
25. Iranian Hostages Case (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3. The Court wrote:
The Vienna Conventions, which codify the law of diplomatic and consular relations, state
principles and rules essential for the maintenance of peaceful relations between States and
accepted throughout the world by nations of all creeds, cultures and political complexions.
Id. at 24. Later in the Judgment it stated this conclusion even more strongly:
Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical constraint
in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. But what has above all to be emphasized is the extent and
seriousness of the conflict between the conduct of the Iranian State and its obligations under the
whole corpus of the international rules of which diplomatic and consular law is comprised, rules
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the subject, both multilateral and bilateral, are complements to a plethora
of state practice, court judgments, and writers' opinions supporting these
rules.26
It is more difficult to apply the Restatement's general rule concerning the
relationship between international agreements and customary law to the
United Nations Charter provisions that restrict the use of force. 27 The
Restatement reports that the restriction on the use of force has become
customary law, but it only refers to the United Nations Charter as the basis
for the rule.28
No reference is made in the comments and reporters' notes to a network
of agreements, state practice dehors the Charter, court judgments, or
statements of state officials or writers to support the conclusion that the rule
on the use of force is customary law. As presented, the Restatement relies
solely on the United Nations Charter for the conclusion that the Charter's
"rules in respect of the use of force are. . . binding as customary law and
are jus cogens. " 2 9
On its face, the Restatement's treatment of the use of force rule raises
troubling questions about the role of international agreements in the devel-
opment of customary law. Does the United Nations Charter, standing
alone, provide a clear basis for the customary international law restrictions
on the use of force? Certainly, the prohibition as found in Article 2(4)
would appear to be generalizable. 30 Is it generalizable, however, outside of
the context of the entire United Nations Charter? Can one argue that
adherence to the entire United Nations Charter by states represents state
practice in support of the rule in the same way that we expect of nations
when a nontreaty based rule evolves? What is the basis for an opiniojuris in
support of the particular isolated rule in question? Can one ever find an
opinio juris or state practice in support of a specific rule based on states'
adherences to a broad international agreement?
Fortunately, the authors of the Restatement were not required to rest their
controversial conclusion solely on the basis of one international agreement;
other evidence to support the conclusion might have been invoked. Such
26. See RESTATEMENT Ch. 3 introductory note & bibliography at 21-24 (Tent. Draft No. 4). A more
cautious approach was taken by the Restatement in the cases of privileges and immunities of member
representatives to international organizations, diplomatic agents in transit, and special missions due to
the conflict in state practice. Id. § 467 reporters' notes at 1; id. § 461 reporters' notes at 11, 13.
27. RESTATEMENT § 905 comment g (rent. Draft No. 6).
28. Id.
29. Id. comment g. See also id. § 102 comment k; RESTATEMENT pt. IX introductory note at 159
(Tent. Draft No. 5) (remedies in international law).
30. Article 2(4) states:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
977
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evidence, albeit controversial, could have included state practice, as well as
a multitude of official and unofficial statements of government officials,
international organizations, and writers to the effect that the Charter's
restrictions on the use of force reflect general international law binding on
all states as jus cogens.3 1
Furthermore, there is no doubt that the Charter was intended for wide-
spread acceptance and has received that acceptance. It is also clear that
states' use of force in international relations was the predominant reason for
the establishment of the United Nations. Limitation of the use of force was
the centerpiece upon which the Charter system was built. 32 This situation is
unlike the usual case in which a number of more or less equal rules are
found within a single agreement. Accordingly, acceptance of the Charter
by states might be viewed as approaching a specific adherence to that
important principle.
This brief review of the Restatement's treatment of the law of interna-
tional agreements, human rights, diplomatic immunity, and the use of
force, demonstrates that Section 102, as applied, permits specific rules
found within broad international agreements to contribute to evidence of
customary law. Such a contribution would presumably be in the nature of
31. When the International Court of Justice held that a customary rule of international law on the
use of force did exist, notwithstanding the U.N. Charter provisions on the same subject, it purported to
rely heavily on independent evidence of state practice and opinio juris. Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, Merits (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I. C. J.-, paras. 183-201. In
dissent, Judges Swebel and Jennings argued that the necessary state practice was absent. Since the entry
into force of the United Nations Charter there have been many occasions when states have used force
despite the restrictions in Article 2(4). Some authors construe this history to establish the absence of a
prohibition on the use of force. See Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970);
Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642
(1984). Others find that nations accept the obligation to refrain from the use of force subject to certain
acknowledged exceptions. State practice is found to conform generally to this obligation. See L.
HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 135-64 (1979); Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are
Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1971); Schachter, International Law in Theory and
Practice, 178 REC. DES COURS 9. 133-79 (1982); Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984).
In response to the United Kingdom's claim that it had a right to sweep the Corfu Channel for mines
despite the fact that the Channel was territorial waters of Albania, the International Court of Justice
stated:
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of
force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the
present defects in international organization find a place in international law.
Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35.
The question of the use of force might have been addressed in the Hostages case after the United
States aborted rescue attempt, but the Court avoided the issue. United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 43.
32. U.N. CHARTER preamble, arts. 1,2. See H. KELSEN, THE LAW OFTHE UNITED NATIONS 3-19(Ist
ed. 1950); Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 REC. DES COuRS 133-66 (1982);
Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1984); Schachter, The
Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984).
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state practice and would be based upon adherence of states to the agreement
as a whole. 33 Section 102 has also been applied in a way that suggests the
acceptance of an agreement as a whole may provide state practice and
opiniojuris for a specific rule found within an agreement to be considered
customary law.34
While the Restatement, perhaps unnecessarily, made such use of an
international agreement in one unique case-the use of force-others
would not necessarily be so restrained. Equating acceptance of the agree-
ment in its entirety with support for an isolated rule presents a number of
difficulties. First, the provision might be linked to other provisions in the
agreement either for functional reasons or for political reasons arising out
of the trade-offs negotiated during the development of the agreement.
35
Second, acceptance of the agreement by states might be motivated by
support for other provisions. Thus, the adherence would not form a reliable
basis for concluding that states have accepted the specific rule outside of the
context of the agreement. 36 Third, adherence to the agreement as a whole
would have little relevance to a conclusion that there is an opinio juris
relating to the specific provision.
The review of the four substantive areas above does not clearly resolve
these questions. The Restatement's reliance on broad agreements to estab-
lish specific rules does support the view that general participation in an
international agreement provides particularized support for isolated rules
found within the agreement. On the other hand, the Restatement was
careful to select only certain rules for this treatment and its conclusions that
those rules had become customary law were, or might have been, supported
by evidence derived from sources independent of the agreements.
2. The Effect of Networks of International Agreements on Customary
International Law
The discussion above focused on the role that major international agree-
ments may play in the development of customary international law. In
33. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3,
26-27, the Court addressed the argument of Denmark and the Netherlands that the Federal Republic of
Germany's signing of the Convention on the Continental Shelf and its acceptance of the fundamental
concept of coastal state rights in respect of the continental shelf caused it to become bound to the
Convention's equidistance rule for delimiting continental shelf boundaries. The Court found that
insufficient evidence was presented to particularly establish the equidistance rule as customary law.
34. See RESTATEMENT § 102 comment c (Tent. Draft No. 6),
35. See infra notes 36-48, 60-64, and accompanying text.
36. Walden writes: "the opinio juris of a state can sometimes be identified with what it has said, or
would, under certain circumstances, probably say. But it can not be identified with what some other
body has said, without further evidence that it does in fact endorse this formulation." Walden, supra
note 12, at 100. See also materials cited supra note 12.
979
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addition, the Restatement reports that networks of bilateral agreements
may also give rise to such law. 37 An analysis of such networks and the
Restatement's conclusions, provides a further insight into the role of
international agreements in the development of customary international
law. Interestingly, in every one of the three areas of networks addressed by
the Restatement-extradition, taxation, and international trade-the Re-
statement found no resulting customary international law.
In the case of extradition, a widespread network of extradition treaties
exists. 38 They employ many similar generalizable rules such as those
relating to specialty, political offenses, and double jeopardy, as well as
procedures for initiating a request. Nevertheless, the Restatement con-
cludes that international law does not obligate a state to extradite persons
absent an international agreement to do so. 39 This conclusion is reached
notwithstanding the fact that states do extradite even in the absence of such
agreements. 40
Similarly, there exists a comprehensive network of international tax
treaties that conforms to an underlying principle proscribing double taxa-
tion of income. 41 Many of these agreements are patterned after model
treaties developed by the League of Nations and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the guidelines de-
veloped by the United Nations. 42 Despite these commonalities and the
presence of a generalized principle, the Restatement concludes that, absent
a binding international agreement, international law imposes no duty on
states to avoid double taxation. 43
The same conclusions are reached in the case of international trade
relations, an area that is largely dominated by the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).44 Generalized principles relating to most fa-
vored nation treatment, prohibitions on indirect barriers to imports, sub-
sidies and countervailing duties, and dumping are found within the GATT
and are implemented through a widespread network of international agree-
37. RESTATEMENT § 102 comment i (Tent. Draft No. 6).
38. See M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE (1983);
M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1974).
39. RESTATEMENT Ch. 4 introductory note at 64 (Tent. Draft No. 5) (extradition); id. § 486.
40. Id. comment b. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 38, at I. §§ 6-1, 6-2. Bassiouni is of the opinion
that in regard to international crimes the network of international agreement imposing a duty to
prosecute or extradite has given rise to duties under customary international law. Id. at ch.l, § 2-5.
41. RESTATEMENT § 413 comment a & reporters' notes at 3 (Tent. Draft No. 6).
42. Id. § 413 reporters' notes at 3; Whittaker, An Examination of the OECD and UN Model Tar
Treaties, 8 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 38 (1982).
43. RESTATEMENT § 413 (Tent. Draft No. 6).
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ments among large numbers of states. 45 Nevertheless, no principle of
international law is derived from this network. 46
What is the basis for the conclusion that no customary international law
is derivable from the networks of agreements found in the areas of extradi-
tion, taxation, and international trade? It is not the lack of generalizable
principles, nor is it the lack of a sufficient number of participants. 47 One
answer might be that the treaty parties have spoken and have made it clear
that they do not recognize a customary law obligation. That type of
obligation will be assumed only when it is the subject of an individualized
international agreement. Such an answer would be sufficient. Even if such
statements have been uttered it is important to know why there is reluctance
to accept into customary law rules that have received widespread adherence
in networks of international agreements.
In most cases such clear restrictions on the rules used in international
agreements subject to widespread participation will not be found. In
addition, if participation in the multilateral agreement or network of
agreements is truly widespread as required by the Restatement, state
practice dehors the agreement will be unlikely. There will be few such
events, and those events may involve the least important international
actors or unique circumstances. Thus, conclusions about the customary
law effect of these agreements may have to be based largely on the nature of
the rule itself or interpretive, self-serving statements of officials.
Accordingly, the nature of the legal obligations found in the network of
agreements on extradition, double taxation, and international trade which
the Restatement held had not become customary law ought to be explored
in contrast with the multilateral agreements that the Restatement held did
contribute to customary law. In the former cases, the central principles are
generalizable or, at least, no less so than the rules of treaty obligation,
human rights, diplomatic immunity, or the use of force. They are also
subject to widespread participation. On the other hand, these obligations
are more closely the result of a quid pro quo arrangement that may not
permit their use outside the fabric of the agreement.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the agreements on
diplomatic immunity do provide integrated sets of rules. Many of these
45. REsTATEMENT §§ 802, 805, 806 (Tent. Draft No. 4). See A. LOWENFELD, VI INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 23-27 (1983). The recent efforts of the
U.S.S.R. to participate in the GATT illustrates, perhaps, the universal importance of the system. Soviet
Seeks Status in GA7T, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1986 at 24, col. 1.
46. RESTATEMENT pt. VIII introductory note (Tent. Draft No. 4).
47. D'Amato focuses on the question of whether or not the GATT is generalizable. A. D'AMATO,
supra note 2, at 105-06. The Restatement focuses on the question of whether the agreement was
formulated for states generally. RESTATEMENT § 102.
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rules, however, are separable and were already part of customary law.
Those agreements do not present a situation in which the participants
negotiated trade-offs of state interests in order to reach new, integrated
compromise results. The human rights conventions represent situations in
which the negotiators focused on high aspirations of humanity rather than
the compromise of individual state interests. While certain state interests
were at stake, those interests were minor compared to the more general
aspirations of the negotiators.
The restrictions on the use of force found in the United Nations Charter
are, perhaps, more troublesome. While the aspirations were equally noble,
some real and direct state interests were under negotiation. A highly
negotiated Security Council system was developed to complement the
limitations on the use of force. Adherence to the United Nations Charter
represents a commitment to the larger United Nations system and not
necessarily to one, albeit important, portion of the system. This circum-
stance makes it problematic whether adherence to the Charter alone should
be considered sufficient to promote the rule of the use of force. Only if one
relies on substantial information that is external to the Charter for more
specific evidence of state practice and opinio juris, could one credibly
begin to distinguish the case of the use of force from extradition, double
taxation and economic relations. 48
Thus, the Charter's restriction on the use of force is more comparable to
the agreements on extradition, taxation, and international trade than to the
agreements on the law of treaties, diplomatic immunity, and human rights.
Real and traditional state interests were directly at stake in the former.
Codification of existing law or noble generalized aspirations were not the
primary focus of those provisions. Despite widespread adherence to those
networks of agreements, there is insufficient evidence of state practice and
opinio juris dehors the agreements to sustain the heavy burden of proof
required to bring individual rules found within these networks into custom-
ary international law. The same proof also may be necessary to support the
conclusion on the use of force restriction.
An additional consideration that may have helped to support the con-
clusion that the taxation and international trade agreements, and perhaps
the extradition treaties, could not easily give rise to customary international
law concerns the technical nature of the obligations. While one might be
able to articulate generalized rules prohibiting double taxation or proscrib-
ing certain trade practices, the essence of the rules will be found in the
48. See the literature cited in RESTATEMENT § 905 reporters' notes at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 6). In
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.-, the
International Court of Justice purported to rely heavily on this evidence to support its customary
international law finding. Id. at paras. 183-201.
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technical arrangements that implement those principles. Thus, it is difficult
to merge a generalized principle of this sort into international law without
the accompanying detail that must be negotiated individually. 49 The same
is not true for most of the Vienna Convention's rules relating to interna-
tional agreements; nor is it necessarily true in the case of human rights
obligations or diplomatic immunity.50
Thus, the law does permit some individual rules found in international
agreements to merge into customary law apart from the overall agreement.
Certain factors are appropriately considered when determining whether a
rule found within an international agreement may give rise to new custom-
ary international law. These factors include:
1. The nature of the subject matter. An agreement which addresses
generalized interests and aspirations of the international community may
be more likely to produce new law than an agreement which focuses on
specific state interests.
2. The nature of the negotiations. A particular rule that was the product
of compromises across the range of provisions in the agreement may be less
appropriate for merger into customary law than a rule that resulted from a
more atomized negotiation.
3. The nature of the obligation. A rule that is interlinked with other
provisions in the agreement would be less able to be considered as a
customary rule separated from the fabric of the agreement than a rule that is
independent of other obligations.
4. The nature of the rule. A rule that requires highly technical methods of
implementation would require the specificity of an international agree-
ment, as contrasted with more generalized obligations that are possible to
implement as custom. Furthermore, if international institutions are re-
quired to be used or established, customary law is inappropriate.
49. The International Court of Justice wrote recently in the Gulf of Maine maritime boundary case:
A body of detailed rules is not to be looked for in customary international law which in fact
comprises a limited set of norms for ensuring the co-existence and vital co-operation of the
members of the international community, together with a set of customary rules whose presence in
the opiniojuris of States can be tested by induction based on the analysis of a sufficiently extensive
and convincing practice, and not by deduction from preconceived ideas.
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 299.
50. For example, the International Court of Justice recognized the generalized nature of the human
rights obligations set out in the Genocide Convention. The major focus of that convention was not
specific technical rules of behavior. Rather, the Convention sought to assure that behavior conformed to
the more general goal of the Convention: to eliminate genoCide. This conception of the Genocide
Convention played a major role in the Court's determination that a liberal rule on reservations to the
Convention was appropriate. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the




These factors may help to explain why some of the agreements discussed
above are consonant with customary law and others are not. The sole
exception might be the rule concerning the restrictions on the use of force.
That conclusion of the Restatement may be explained in one of the follow-
ing ways: (1) the Restatement's conclusion on the customary law is wrong;
(2) while the rule is less appropriate for customary law, state practice and
opinio juris is so strong that the rule is now custom despite the factors
suggesting that is inappropriate; or (3) the Restatement accepts the view
that rules found in international agreements may create international law,
notwithstanding the absence of independant state practice and opiniojuris,
and the contrary indications of the factors listed above. An examination of
the treatment of the law of the sea may shed more light on the role that
international agreements may play in the making of customary law.
C. The Law of the Sea
1. Substantive Treatment
Throughout the history of international law, writers and statesmen have
found the law of the sea to be the prototype for the study of international
law. The interplay of custom and international agreements in this area has a
long history. This area has experienced considerable change in the years
subsequent to World War II. Three United Nations Conferences on the law
of the sea have produced five conventions. 5 For many years, the most
recent conference, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, constituted one of the major activities of the United Nations system.
The Conference produced the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS
Convention). This convention is not yet in force, but as of April, 1986 there
were 159 signatures and twenty-seven ratifications.52 The United States and
51. The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea produced four Conventions:
Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962); Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for
signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force June
10, 1964); Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for signature Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Sept. 10, 1964);
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, opened for
signature Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969,559 U.N.T.S. 285 (entered into force Mar.
20, 1966).
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea produced the Convention on the Law of
the Sea, opened forsignature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M.
1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as LOS Convention].
52. LOS Convention, supra note 51; Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, LAW OF THE SEA BULL. No. 7, at 1-6 (Apr. 1986).
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some other countries have announced that they will not be parties to it.53
The Restatement devoted considerable attention to the law of the sea and
the changes which the recent negotiations and the 1982 Convention may
have made in customary law. In its introduction to the law of the sea
chapter, the Restatement reports that although the LOS Convention is not
in force and the United States is not a signatory, it is an important basis for
the customary law of the sea now in effect. 54 This conclusion is consonant
with the view recently expressed by the Chamber of the International Court
of Justice that determined the Gulf of Maine boundary dispute between the
United States and Canada. 55
The Restatement points out that much of the Convention merely restates
the law found in the previous 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions which in
part codified customary law existing at that time. 56 More importantly, the
Restatement reports that the LOS Convention has given rise to new rules of
customary international law: "Other provisions in the Convention set forth
rules that, whether or not they were law in 1958, became law since that
time, as they were accepted at the Conference by consensus and have
influenced, and by now reflect, the practice of states." 57
According to this statement, the Convention provides a convenient
codification of existing law that is derived from other sources, although the
negotiations at the Conference played a role in the development of that law.
On its face, this statement suggests that the Convention and the negotia-
tions standing alone would not be sufficient to establish customary law.
The Restatement cautiously declares that the entire Convention has not
merged into customary law. Thus, it points out that a few parts of the
53. President's Statement Concerning the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 18 WEEaY COMP.
PRs. Doc. 887 (July 9, 1982).
54. RESTATEMENT pt. V introductory note at 164--65 (Tent. Draft No. 6) (law of the sea).
55. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
246, 294. The Judgment states:
The Chamber notes in the first place that the Convention [on the Law of the Sea] has not yet
come into force and that a number of States do not appear inclined to ratify it. This, however, in no
way detracts from the consensus reached on large portions of the instrument and, above all, cannot
invalidate the observation that certain provisions of the Convention, concerning the continental
shelf and the exclusive economic zone. . . were adopted without any objections. . . .This
concordance of views is worthy of note. . . .In the Chamber's opinion, these provisions, even if
in some respects they bear the mark of the compromise surrounding their adoption, may neverthe-
less be regarded as consonant at present with general international law on the question.
Id.
56. "[M]any of the provisions of the Convention follow closely provisions in the 1958 conventions
(on the law of the sea) to which the United States is a party and which very largely restate customary





Convention, such as the deep seabed regime, have not merged into custom-
ary law due to the lack of supporting evidence dehors the Convention. 58
The Restatement is therefore admittedly selective in its use of rules found in
the LOS Convention.
Caution is particularly appropriate in this case. Some of the reasons that
justify such caution are:
1. The nature of the subject matter. Much of the law of the sea under
negotiation concerned real state interests, not noble aspirations of a general
humanitarian kind. 59
2. The nature of the negotiations. It is beyond dispute that the negotia-
tions at the Law of the Sea Conference were conducted on the basis of a
package deal. Trade-offs between subjects were common.
3. The nature of the obligation. All portions of the Convention were
thereby linked together as a political matter.60
4. The nature of the rule. The Convention establishes international
organizations and sets out detailed obligations, sometimes with numerical
specifications. Such institutions and requirements are not susceptible to
implementation by customary international law.
In addition to these considerations a few other facts suggest care should
be taken before concluding that the LOS Convention has given rise to
customary international law. First, many of the provisions of the Conven-
tion embody new concepts created at the negotiations, and states have not
implemented them in practice. 61 Second, the views of authorities about the
effect of the Convention on customary law differ. Some have declared it to
be evidence of existing law while others refuse to accept it as law except in
regard to states which become parties to the agreement. 62 Third, the
Convention was adopted only three years ago by the Law of Sea Conference
on a split vote; it has not come into force for any state. 63 In the face of these
reasons for caution, the Restatement does find that a number of rules found
58. See id. at 165-67 & n.4.
59. See Charney, The United States and the Law of the Sea After UNCLOS Ill-The Impact of
General International Law, 46 L. & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 37 (1983).
60. See Caminos & Molitor, Progressive Development of International Law and the Package Deal,
79 AM. J. INT'L L. 871 (1985); see also Buzan, Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in Technique
at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 324 (1981).
61. See Charney, supra note 59; Treves, The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention of 1982:
Prospects for Europe, IX GREENWICH F. 166, 171 (1984).
62. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 246, 294; Continental Shelf(Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 171 (Judgement
of Feb. 24, 1982) (Oda, J., dissenting); Text of Declarations, LAW OFTHE SEA BULL. No. 5, at 3-15 (July
1985) (various declarations of states when signing the LOS Convention in Jamaica); Charney, supra
note 59; Macrae, Customary International Law and the United Nations' Law of the Sea Treaty, 13
CALIF. W. INT'L J. 181, 182 (1983).
63. See RESTATEMENT pt. V introductory note at 164 (Tent. Draft No. 6) (law of the sea).
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in the Convention have contributed to the development of customary law
and now reflect the law.
a. The Exclusive Economic Zone
The Restatement reports that the regime of the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) that was developed at the Law of the Sea Conference and
written into the Convention is now customary law.64 This finding not only
includes the right of the coastal state to claim a 200-mile zone but also
includes many of the detailed rights and obligations relating to the zone that
are contained in the Convention. 65 According to the Restatement, only a
limited number of specific provisions relating to the details of the regime
are not customary law.66
Any review of state practice with respect to the 200-mile zone will show
that the vast majority of coastal states have claimed some jurisdiction in the
200-mile zone as a right under international law. Beyond the general claims
there is precious little commonality. State claims vary tremendously on the
nature and extent of rights claimed in the zone; few such claims match the
regime found in the Convention. 67 Thus, the state practice dehors the treaty
does not support the view that the details of the Convention's economic
zone regime are custom.
The EEZ regime was a result of difficult negotiation which linked a
number of issues. For example, the major maritime states only accepted the
regime on the condition that the waters within it were subject to many high
seas rights. Other states strongly resisted that effort. 68 While a consensus
was reached at the negotiations as a result of compromise, the same
consensus has not been found in practice outside the Convention. 69
The regime of the EEZ negotiated at the Conference produced an
agreement that established basic technical rules for the conservation and
exploitation of living resources in the zone. This included the requirement
that the coastal states engage in a process of evaluating the fish stocks and
their own resources in order to manage the fishery for optimum utilization.
64. Id. § 514.
65. Id. comments a & i, reporters' notes at 1.
66. See id. comment f, reporters' notes at 4.
67. See Charney, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Public International Law, 15 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 233, 239 (1985); Juda, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Compatibility of National Claims and
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 16 OCEAN DECv. & INT'L. L. 1 (1986).
68. REsTATrEMENr § 511 reporters' notes at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 6). See also Charney, supra note 59,
at 44.
69. The diversity of state actions as reflected in domestic legislation, proclamations, and other
activities of coastal states is explored in Charney, supra note 67. See also Juda, supra note 67.
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They are to provide other states access to excess resources. 70 While the
concept is clear, the enforceability of this regime even under the Conven-
tion is questionable. It is doubtful that states can be found to have imple-
mented the technical details of this regime which, according to the Restate-
ment, has merged into customary international law. 71
The duties of the coastal state to foreign state scientific research in the
EEZ is another area in which intense negotiations took place. The highly
negotiated solution contained in the Convention has yet to be found in the
practice of states dehors the Convention. 72
b. The Continental Shelf
Similar problems arise with respect to the seaward limit of the continen-
tal shelf regime. The Restatement reports that the agreement to extend the
continental shelf regime to the limit of the continental margin was accepted
by consensus.7 3 This agreement was predicated upon a rather technical
definition of that limit and a specific procedure for fixing that limit on the
seabed. In addition, the Convention sets out certain rules applicable to
coastal states' activities on the margin beyond the 200-mile limit and a
requirement that there be revenue sharing from that area.74 No state
practice can be found to support a conclusion that these detailed provisions
have been implemented or accepted by states independent of the Conven-
tion. It appears that even the United States might extend its continental
shelf jurisdiction without regard to some related obligations. 75
c. The Transit Regimes
The same problem arises in the context of the militarily and econom-
ically important provisions for transit passage through straits used for
international navigation, as well as the provision for passage through
archipelagic waters. 76 The willingness of the United States and other major
70. LOS Convention, supra note 51, arts. 61-70; RESTATEMENT § 514 comment f (Tent. Draft No.
6). See Charney, supra note 59, at 48.
71. See Charney, supra note 67.
72. See LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 245-55; RESTATEMENT § 514 comment h (Tent. Draft
No. 6); Chamey, supra note 67; Report of the Committee on the Law of the Sea, PRoc. & COMm. REP.
AM. BRANCH INT'L L.A. 148, 173-175 (1983-84).
73. See RESTATEMENT § 511 & reporters' notes at 8 (Tent. Draft No. 6); id. § 515 comment a.
74. See LOS Convention, supra note 51, arts. 76, 82; RESTATEMENT § 511 comment a, reporters'
notes at 8 (Tent. Draft No. 6); id. § 515 comment a; Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea: The Ninth Session (1980), 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 211, 227-31 (1981).
75. See generally Ralph, Defining the Boundaries of the Outer Continental Shelf to Establish
Jurisdiction Over Resources, OCEANS '84 EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE SYMPOSIUM 122 (1984).
76. RESTATEMENT § 513 (Tent. Draft No. 6).
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maritime countries to accept the twelve-mile territorial sea and the estab-
lishment of archipelagic waters was linked to these transit provisions. 77
None of these new formulations developed at the Law of the Sea Con-
ference has yet seen widespread implementation consistent with the Con-
vention. 78 In these cases detailed provisions of the Convention require
particularized technical methods of application, such as the mathematical
limitations on archipelagic baselines and specific limitations on navigation
routes and traffic separation schemes in straits. 79 Can such provisions
become customary law independent of the fabric of the Convention when
there is a paucity of independent state practice dehors the Convention?
d. The Environment
Finally, the Restatement adopts as customary law the LOS Convention's
provisions for the protection of the marine environment. The Convention
contains many generalizable standards of care with respect to the marine
environment. There are also rules that specify the duties and powers of the
coastal state with respect to foreign vessels in adjacent waters.80 Few, if
any, of these specific provisions have been implemented by states.
2. Conclusions on the Law of the Sea
In its treatment of the law of the sea the Restatement assigns international
treaty negotiations a greater role in the formation of customary law than in
any other substantive area of international law. First, the Restatement
permits the selective use of portions of an international agreement that are
the result of a compromise of real and direct state interests. Second, highly
technical solutions to state relations that, in other substantive areas, had
limited the impact of treaty relations on customary law, presented no
obstacle to finding new customary law of the sea. Third, the complex
behavior at the Law of the Sea Conference, and the controversial adoption
of the Convention, provided virtually the sole basis for finding new rules of
customary law. It is thus presumed that a conference and a multilateral
convention that is not yet in force can, without additional evidence, provide
the necessary state practice and opinio juris for the establishment of new
rules of customary law. This conclusion is inconsistent with the treatment
which the Restatement gives such agreements in other substantive areas.
77. Id. reporters' notes at 3-4.
78. See Charney, supra note 67, at 254-55; Chamey, supra note 59, at 44-48.
79. See LOS Convention, supra note 51, arts. 41, 47; RESTATEMENT § 513 comments i & j,
reporters' notes at 3-4 (Tent. Draft No. 6).
80. See RESTATEmENT pt. VI introductory note at 167 (Tent. Draft No. 4) (law of the environment);




The question, therefore, is what role should international law give to the
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements when a search is to
be made for the operative rules of customary international law. Con-
ferences held to negotiate international agreement provide a vehicle by
which states communicate their views for the purpose of producing rules of
law. Agreements reached at such fora do change nations' perceptions of
their rights and duties. If this process were irrelevant to customary law
development, some law may become frozen in time and fail to reflect
movement realized at international negotiations. The gap that could de-
velop between custom and treaty law might complicate interstate relations.
The Restatement's treatment of the law of the sea and the use of force
may be interpreted as supporting the controversial view that the circum-
stances surrounding the negotiation and adoption of an international agree-
ment may, with little more, produce customary international law. Section
102 can be read to support this conclusion since the agreement may be
deemed state practice and may provide the necessary evidence of opinio
juris.81
Alternatively, it may be argued that the authors of the Restatement do not
maintain that international agreements, standing alone, can create new
customary international law. With the sole exception of the rule on the use
of force, the Restatement has made reference to state practice and other
evidence dehors the international agreements supporting the customary
law conclusions. Such references, albeit sometimes unproven, are made in
the introduction to the chapter on the law of the sea. One could thus
conclude that Section 102 requires more than the negotiation and adoption
of an agreement to establish a new norm of customary law.
There are difficulties with either interpretation of the Restatement. The
conclusion that more than the agreement itself must be shown before
customary law is found presents problems for one seeking to find evidence
of state practice and opinio juris. In cases where the required widespread
adherence to the agreement exists, substantial evidence of state actions
taken in circumstances where the agreement is not directly applicable may
be hard to obtain. As a consequence, support for new rules of customary
law will have to be found in the agreement and in secondary evidence
derived from writers, and perhaps in self-serving official state policy
statements. It is this dilemma that may force some to use tenuous evidence
in support of new norms of customary international law. 82
81. This approach is supported by D'Amato. See supra note 13.
82. It is the same dilemma that supports Professor Anthony D'Amato's controversial theory that
generalizable international agreements, with little more, can give rise to customary international law.
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If, however, an isolated rule contained within an agreement can form the
basis upon which customary law is established, then one must assume that
the negotiation and acceptance of the agreement as a whole can be relied
upon to provide the elements of customary law. This would be difficult. For
example, it is not clear how such proof can support the conclusion that there
has been acceptance or opinio juris with respect to a rule that is isolated
from the context of the agreement as a whole. In the unique circumstance of
the restrictions on the use of force found within the United Nations Charter,
the centrality of that rule might permit such a conclusion. In cases where
the rule is not preeminent, such a conclusion would be highly questionable
in the absence of independent evidence dehors the agreement. Further-
more, this approach might lead in the direction of establishing ad hoc
multilateral negotiations as de facto international legislatures.
Professor Louis Sohn has taken the view that the negotiation of interna-
tional agreements can readily develop new norms of international law. 83 He
has suggested that this development arises out of the difficulty faced by
authorities seeking to distill patterns of state practice and opiniojuris from
the overwhelming quantity of public and secret information generated by
states. 84 In seeking a more manageable method for finding and defining
customary international law, he has suggested that the international com-
munity may be expanding the role which conferences called to negotiate
international agreements may play in developing new customary interna-
tional law. He maintains that when a rule is the subject of agreement at a
conference, that rule is presumed to give rise to custom once a number of
interested states behave in conformity with the rule and no state objects. 85
He also suggests that the international community might decide that
''consensus at a conference plus a signature by a vast majority of the
participants creates a general norm of international law. . . . binding on
[states] from the very moment of [the] adoption [of the international
agreement]." 86
See supra note 13.
83. Sohn, The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law Developments, American University
Washington College of Law Edwin A. Moors Lecture (Oct. 11, 1984), 34 AM. U.L. REv. 271 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as Sohn, Developments]; Sohn, "GenerallyAccepted" InternationalRules, 61 WASH.
L. REv. 1073 (1986).
84. Sohn, Developments, supra note 83, at 275.
85. Sohn writes:
If a sufficient number of States having a special interest in the application of a new rule start
acting in accordance with it, and no States object to it, there is a clear presumption that the rule
agreed on at the conference, although the agreement has not yet been ratified, has become an
accepted rule of customary international law.
Id. at 279.
86. Id. This thesis may even draw support from a Judgement of a Chamber of the International
Court of Justice. See Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of MaineArea (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246,294
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Professor Prosper Weil reaches a similar conclusion:
[Tihe conventional norm has not been frontally assaulted but cunningly
outflanked. The principle remains that an international treaty binds only the
states that have become parties to it, and cannot create obligations incumbent
upon third states. Yet behind the mask of classicism thus retained there has
been a change of substance: in reality, the conventional norm itself may now
create obligations incumbent upon all states, including those not parties to the
convention in question.8 7
Unlike Sohn, Weil does not appear to be pleased with this development.
As a method to facilitate the establishment of new rules of international
law, this approach has much appeal. Unfortunately, it also presents certain
difficulties. Some of these difficulties have been identified above. How, for
example, would one determine whether a rule developed in a negotiation
can be separated from the fabric of the agreement? How could one distin-
guish between actions and statements of officials that support the negoti-
ated agreement as an agreement, and statements intended to support the
rule as customary law? The answer to both of these questions might be that
one looks to the official statements of state representatives at the negotia-
tions for opinio juris supporting the rule as a norm of international law.
The record of the negotiations may be clear on the question, but that is
unlikely. It certainly was not clear in the case of the Law of the Sea
Conference that was the focus of Sohn's article. 88 Even if the record were
clear, such strong reliance on the intent of the negotiators to create interna-
tional law may weaken the foundations of customary international law.
It is well understood that international law, being a rudimentary system
of law, is fragile. To the extent that customary law is effective as law, it must
reflect the real interests of the members of the international community. To
a certain extent, it must also reflect the normative aspirations of the
community. At the same time, it must not be so divergent from actual state
practice and true state interests that it becomes an unrealistic dream. 89 As a
consequence, the traditional rules for determining whether there is a rule of
customary international law seek to make the most accurate appraisal of
para. 94.
87. Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 Am. J. INT'L L. 413, 438 (1983).
88. See Sohn, Developments, supra note 83. It is widely recognized that the Law of the Sea
Conference negotiations were conducted largely offthe record. Consequently, the official records of the
conference are of limited use. At the signing of the Convention, nations took different positions on the
legal effect of the Convention. These declarations are collected in LAW OF THE SEA BULL. No. 5, supra
note 62, and LAW OF THE SEA BULL. No. 6, supra note 52. All the participants knew they were speaking
for posterity, and were trying to make a record that would serve their particular interests.
89. See I H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 120 (1945); K. MAREK, IDENTITY AND
CoNTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 554 (2d ed. 1968).
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states' positions. This is why it is important to consider the actual behavior
of states in real situations. 90
Statements of officials faced with real situations have been very signifi-
cant. Information on states' views derived from abstract situations has
provided less authoritative information on their true positions. While
resolutions of international organizations, such as those of the United
Nations General Assembly, have become accepted evidence to support
rules of international law,91 there is much debate over their utility. The
debate arises because resolutions are likely to represent highly politicized
positions of state representatives divorced from the reality of international
life.92 Even when a resolution is utilized as evidence of international law,
90. In 1969 the International Court of Justice emphasized the importance of state practice in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44:
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the
formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a purely
conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that that within the period in question,
short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision
invoked; -and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that
a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.
Judge Read wrote in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 191: "The
only convincing evidence of State practice is to be found in seizures, where the coastal State asserts its
sovereignty over the waters in question by arresting a foreign ship .. "The required consistency of
the state practice was explained in the recent Judgment on the Merits in Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at para. 186. See H. TimzLwAv, supra
note 2, at 31, 58; Akehurst, supra note 2, at 2. Contra A. D'AMATo, supra note 2, at 66. See also Scott &
Carr, The International Court of Justice and the TreatylCustom Dichotomy, 16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 347,
348-49 (1981).
91. Higgins wrote in 1963:
The United Nations is a very appropriate body to look for indications of developments in
international law, for international custom is to be deduced from the practice of states, which
includes their international dealings as manifested by their diplomatic actions and public pro-
nouncements. With the development of international organizations, the votes and views of states
have come to have legal significance as evidence of customary law. Moreover, the practice of states
comprises their collective acts as well as the total of their individual acts. . . . [C]ollective acts
of states, repeated by and acquiesced in by sufficient numbers with sufficient frequency, even-
tually attain the status of law. The existence of the United Nations-and especially its accelerated
trend towards universality of membership since 1955-now provides a very clear, very concen-
trated, focal point for state practice.
R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE
UN-ED NATIONS 2 (1963).
92. See Western Sahara 1975 I.C.J. 12, 29-36 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16); RESTATEMENT § 102
reporters' notes at 2 (Tent. Draft No. 6); M. BaDJAOuI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC
ORDER 134-44 (1979); G. TUNKiN, THEORYOFINTERNATIONALLAW 165,170, 172(1974); Agrawala, The
Role of General Assembly Resolutions as Trend-Setters of State Practice, 21 INDIAN J. Itr'L L. 513
(1981); Cheng, supra note 12; Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the GeneralAssembly, 60
AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966); Gross, The UnitedNations and the Role of Law, 191NT'LORG. 537,555-58
(1965); Hiyashi, The Role of Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly in the Formative
Process ofInternational Customary Law, 25 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 11 (1982); Schachter, The
Washington Law Review
care should be taken to determine the specific nature of the resolution and
the facts surrounding its adoption. 93
The negotiation of international agreements at international conferences
falls somewhere between actions of states faced with specific real situations
and votes to adopt resolutions at meetings of international organizations.
Some negotiations are closer to real and pressing international disputes
than others, and positions taken at the former are more likely to represent
real decisions of the participating states. Adherence to an international
agreement by a state represents an even stronger decision. But negotiations
and agreements do differ. Those like the United States-Iran agreements that
led to the freeing of the hostages, are based strictly on specific live
disputes. 94 Others, like the human rights conventions, are not focused on
any specific incident. 95 While the former may closely reflect what states are
willing to do in real situations, it is the latter that are more likely to be
considered as forming the basis for new rules of international law. The
latter, however, are least likely to reflect the reality of state policy. But it is
the reality of state policy that should be given the greatest attention when
searching for customary international law, not the more abstract activities
of state representatives at multilateral fora.
It is this paradox that the legal community must face if greater reliance is
to be placed on international agreements in defining customary interna-
tional law. The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements
Evolving International Law of Development, 15 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3-6 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Schacter, Evolving Law]; Schachter, The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United
Nations, 109 REc. DES COURS. 165, 173-84 (1963).
93. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, reprinted in
17 I.L.M. 1. 27-31 (1978). In this case Libya claimed that its right to nationalize all of the rights,
interests, and property of two international oil companies was not subject to limitation by international
law. Libya argued that its position was supported by rules of international law relating to the sovereignty
of states over natural resources established by various United Nations resolutions including the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States. The Award examined the text of the resolutions, the voting
patterns, and statements by interested states before rejecting the Libyan proposition. See also
Schachter. Evolving Law, supra note 92; other materials cited supra note 92.
94. These agreements include: Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 418 (1981) (relating to the comments made by Iran);
Undertaking of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 75
AM. J. INT'L L. 425 (198 1); Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 75 Am. J. ITrr'L L. 422 (1981); Escrow Agreement, 75
AM. J. Irr'L L. 426 (1981).
Articles on these agreements include: Belman, Owen & Lowenfeld, Remarks, The U.S.IIranian
Settlement, 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 236 (1981); Norton & Collins, Reflection on the Iranian
Hostage Settlement, 67 A.B.A. J. 428 (1981); Note, Iranian Hostage Agreement Under International
and United States Law, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 822 (1981); Note, The United States-Iran Hostage
Agreement: A Study in Presidential Powers, 15 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 149 (1982).
95. See supra notes 21-23.
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might allow one to posit new rules of international law. Unfortunately,
those rules may not reflect the true normative standards that guide states in
reality.
It is, perhaps, for these reasons that the importance of state practice as a
critical element in establishing customary international law, even when
the norm is found in multilateral conventions, has received renewed empha-
sis in the words of the most recent judgments of the International Court of
Justice. In its 1985 Judgment on the ocean boundary between Libya and
Malta, the Court wrote: "It is of course axiomatic that the material of
customary international laws is to be looked for primarily in the actual
practice and opinio juris of States, even though multilateral conventions
may have an important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving
from custom, or indeed in developing them."' 96 Most recently, in its
Judgment on the Merits in Military and Paramilitary Activities in an
AgainstNicaragua,97 the Court emphasized that the U.N. Charter's rule on
the lawfulness of the use of force and the evidence of an opinio juris in
support of the norm were not sufficient to establish customary international
law. It stated: "The Court must satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in
the opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice." 98 It then went on to
explore the state practice issue further.99 Unfortunately, the judgments in
both of these cases do not identify the actual evidence of state practice upon
which they purport to rely. Since the state practice was unproven, and
possibly unprovable, the statements in support of the importance of state
practice may be obiter dictum.
Of course, law should not reflect merely what the subjects of the law
would do in the absence of law. 100 The function of law is to promote positive
behavior by setting a normative standard toward which the subjects of the
law will strive. Rules derived from international negotiations may reflect
ideals that are unsullied by the realities of normal international discourse.
The risk, however, is that these ideals may be so removed from the reality of
96. Continental Shelf (Malta v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (construing First United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea). See supra note 51.
,97. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1985, I.C.J.-.
98. Id. at para. 184.
99. Id. at paras. 185-186. Despite this support for state practice, the Court relied heavily on writers
and resolutions for the necessary opiniojuris and for the details of the rule. Id. at paras. 188-95. It even
found that the U.N. Charter's requirement that actions in self defense be reported to the Security
Council neither carried over into the customary law rule, nor presented an obstacle to the existence of
such a rule. Id. at para. 200.
100. It should not pierce Kelsen's "superior limit." H. KLSEN, ALLGEMEINE STAATsLEHRE 18-19
(1925) [hereinafter cited as H. KaLsEN, ALLGEMEMN]; H. KELSEN, supra note 89, at 120. See also K.
MAREK, supra note 89, at 554.
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international behavior that they would not serve effectively as legal
norms. 101
This conclusion does not require the rejection of international con-
ference negotiations and international agreements as evidence of interna-
tional law. Rather, before it is concluded that such negotiations provide
useful evidence of new rules of international law, they should be carefully
viewed in the context of state practice and opiniojuris. The subsidiary rules
suggested above 02 may help to discriminate between those international
agreements that could be invoked to support new rules of international law
and those that ought not to be so utilized.
Such a cautious approach may result in findings that customary law is
substantially different from obligations states assume under international
agreements. If that difference becomes unacceptable, states can certainly
take the necessary actions and make new customary law. The rules found in
international agreements support the development of new law. But in the
absence of significant additional actions, it is unwise to presume that new
customary law arises out of international agreements even with some state
practice. It would risk defining customary law rules that do not reflect
reality and do not effectively influence the actions of states.
101. It would reach what Kelsen has characterized as the "inferior limit." H. KELSEN, ALLGE-
MEINE, supra note 96; H. KELSEN, supra note 89. See also K. MAREK, supra note 89. Care must be taken
to be certain that the rules identified as law fall within the narrow range between the "inferior" and
"superior" limits of law.
102. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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